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Abstract Psychiatric diagnosis has become pervasive in modern culture, exerting an
increasing inﬂuence on notions of personhood, identity practices and forms of self-
governing. The broadening of diagnostic categories and increasing awareness
regarding popular diagnostic categories has led to an increased demand for formal
diagnosis within clinical encounters. However, there is continuing ‘epistemological
uncertainty’ (Fox 2000) surrounding these entities, in part due to their lack of
associated clinical biomarkers and their ‘fuzzy boundaries’. Meanwhile, this
diagnostic expansion has encountered resistance from those concerned with the
alleged ‘over-pathologisation’ of emotional distress. Drawing upon the concepts of
‘diagnostic cultures’ (Brinkmann 2016) and the ‘looping effects of human kinds’
(Hacking 1995), this article considers some of the competing forces acting upon
the contested boundaries of diagnostic categories as they play out within
diagnostic interactions. The study involved ethnographic observations of diagnostic
encounters within several UK-based mental health clinics. By focusing on
interactions where diagnosis is negotiated, ﬁndings illustrate the role played by
different kinds of diagnostic uncertainty in shaping these negotiations. It is argued
that diagnostic reiﬁcation plays a key role in the moral categorisation of patients,
particularly where there is uncertainty regarding individual diagnostic status.
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Diagnostic cultures: expansion, resistance and uncertainty
Psychiatric diagnosis has become a pervasive presence within modern culture (Brinkmann
2016), exerting an increasing inﬂuence on notions of personhood, identity practices and forms
of self-governing. Both modern classiﬁcation systems such as the DSM–5 (American Psychi-
atric Association 2013), and the trend towards dimensional models of mental disorder have
encouraged the broadening of many psychiatric and neurodevelopmental categories, with
increasing numbers receiving diagnoses such as autistic spectrum disorders (Navon and Eyal
2016) and attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Conrad and Potter 2000). This
expansion and increasing lay awareness regarding psychiatric diagnosis has led to growing
demands for formal diagnosis (Chan and Sireling 2010) and practices of self-diagnosis (Brink-
mann 2016, Singh 2011), with psychiatric concepts being widely adopted as explanations for
personal difﬁculties and distress. This work expands upon what Brinkmann refers to as ‘diag-
nostic cultures’ (Brinkmann 2016, 2017), which alludes to the ways in which psychiatric
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diagnoses are now used – not only to understand and treat mental disorders, but also as ways
‘to interpret, regulate, and mediate various forms of self-understanding and activity’ (Brink-
mann 2017: 170). This article will argue that certain diagnoses are more sought after than
others, due in part to an apparent moral hierarchy of diagnosis; in addition, it will be argued
that de-emphasising the ontological uncertainty surrounding more medicalised diagnoses plays
a key role in the moral categorisation of patients, adding to the exclusiveness of such cate-
gories; this in turn facilitates gatekeeping practices within mental health care by allowing
patients to be downgraded.
Research has shown how the growth of collective identities surrounding medical diagnoses
are able to shape and challenge professional authority, policy priorities and social identities
through the formation of ‘embodied health movements’ (Brown and Zavestoski 2004); this can
involve groups of stakeholders such as patients and their family members widening diagnostic
boundaries in order to obtain recognition for atypical or ‘milder’ forms of a condition (e.g.
Navon and Eyal 2016). This ﬁght for diagnostic validation can be seen in the growth of online
communities organised around uncertain and contested diagnoses, which demand recognition
of conditions as physical diseases, and offer support which includes advice and strategies on
acquiring a diagnosis (Conrad and Stults 2010, Dumit 2006). The meaning of a diagnosis can
therefore be partially negotiated by various groups with a stake in medicalising a condition:
not only larger organisations such as pharmaceutical companies and advocacy associations, but
also individuals with contested diagnoses who have an interest in obtaining access to disabil-
ity-related concessions (e.g. sick leave or disability beneﬁts), and who require a narrative to
explain their difﬁculties and differences (Anspach 2011).
Additionally, the marketisation and commodiﬁcation (Brinkmann 2017) of psychiatric diag-
noses has led many individuals to identify with popular categories such as bipolar disorder
and autism, reinterpreting and framing their behaviour in the light of (evolving) diagnostic def-
initions. As illustrated by Hacking’s concept of the ‘looping effects of human kinds’ (1995),
this reframing can in turn change the way in which such diagnoses are classiﬁed (e.g. through
practices of diagnostic identiﬁcation and negotiation which may ultimately contribute to the
broadening of diagnostic categories). Psychiatric diagnoses are now heavily featured within
mainstream entertainment,1 with numerous celebrities now openly discussing their psychiatric
labels, often under the guise of reducing stigma. Such accounts of diagnosis are arguably fed
into the public arena, offering audiences resources for self-interpretation, and providing exam-
ples of diagnostic performativity which create new ways of enacting disorder (Martin 2007).
The evolving nature of psychiatric classiﬁcation also reﬂects the ‘epistemological uncer-
tainty’ (Fox 2000) surrounding these entities, deriving in part from their lack of associated
clinical biomarkers, their ‘fuzzy boundaries’ and uncertain aetiologies.2 With no deﬁnitive way
of diagnosing mental disorder, psychiatry remains partly reliant upon personal narratives, mak-
ing further space for diagnostic negotiation on the part of patients (Healy 2008, Whooley
2010): in addition to the social and political negotiation of diagnosis, there is therefore also
often an element of individual negotiation at the microlevel (i.e. within professional-patient
interactions). With the democratisation of medical knowledge, patients approach diagnostic
encounters with ‘hybrid diagnostic repertoires’ (Anspach 2011: xiv) which include theories
concerning history, diagnosis and prognosis, and ideas about professionals and health services.
This has possibly made patients more willing to challenge and dispute diagnosis, and to seek
advice outside the doctor-patient relationship (Lupton 1997). Nevertheless, professionals retain
the power to ofﬁcially assign diagnosis, meaning that if formal diagnosis is required then it
must be successfully negotiated.
Given that diagnosis is linked to particular forms of treatment (e.g. through clinical guideli-
nes), these categories also remain heavily implicated in the allocation of clinical resources; for
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instance, within UK Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) policy guidance, there is a cur-
rent emphasis on prioritising those with ‘severe and/or enduring mental health problems’, to
which both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are often assumed to belong (e.g. Cardiff and
Vale University Health Board 2012: 7, King 2001, McEvoy and Richards 2007). There are
therefore likely to be opposing forces acting upon the boundaries of diagnosis at the microle-
vel, that is from patients seeking recognition for diverse forms of suffering and from those
who maintain a stake in narrowing the boundaries of diagnostic categories (e.g. professionals
needing to gate-keep access to more intensive and costly services).
Psychiatric diagnosis has, however, been particularly beset by concerns regarding validity
and reliability. Therefore, while recent decades have seen increasing demands for diagnosis
and the recognition of new forms of diagnosis, there has – apparently in reaction to this
expansion – been a rise in discourses surrounding ‘over-diagnosis’ (often from psychiatrists
themselves), whereby psychiatry has been seen as pathologising ‘normal’ aspects of human life
and emotion (e.g. Conrad 2008, Frances 2013, Horwitz 2002, 2011). Critics have also ques-
tioned the epistemological certainty surrounding psychiatric diagnosis (through critiques
regarding reliability and over-diagnosis), and the ontological basis of psychiatric categories,
that is the validity of the categories and whether they should be conceptualised as disease enti-
ties or as reactions to life events.3 These uncertainties have likely been a further inﬂuence
upon diagnostic identiﬁcatory practices, illustrating the multiple (often opposing forces) operat-
ing upon diagnostic cultures, categories and practices, which undoubtedly impact upon patients
who seek out (or resist) diagnostic labels.
Research has also shown that the provision of psychiatric diagnosis is contingent upon a
number of social factors, such as resources (Bhugra et al. 2011, Estroff 1993), pressure from
patients or family members (e.g. Kovshoff et al. 2012, Whooley 2010), professional opinions
regarding the utility of the diagnosis for a particular patient (Allsopp 2017, Kovshoff et al.
2012, Whooley 2010) and previous experiences of professionals leading to the development of
‘intuitive prototypes’ concerning diagnostic categories (Allsopp 2017, see also Light 1980,
Luhrmann 2000). This article argues that diagnostic expansion and uncertainty have a funda-
mental role in shaping diagnostic negotiations and professional categorisation practices within
clinical assessments. As places where discussions regarding diagnosis occur, diagnostic assess-
ments are arguably spaces where the boundaries of these categories are being continually
negotiated and contested by different actors. The following questions will be addressed: (i)
how do cultural ideas concerning diagnosis manifest within and shape diagnostic negotiations
within UK mental health clinics? (e.g. notions surrounding over and underdiagnosis, popular
depictions of mental disorders, etc.) and (ii) what role do individual, epistemological and onto-
logical uncertainty play in shaping diagnostic negotiations and in the moral categorisation of
patients?
Methods
This article draws on research that formed the basis for a doctoral thesis (Lane 2018) which
explored diagnostic identities across pre and post-diagnostic mental health settings. The study
involved ethnographic observations (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007) of diagnostic encounters
across three CMHTs and 1-second opinion psychiatry clinic (PSOC), within the same UK city.
Twenty-six semi-structured interviews with individuals who had received a psychiatric diagno-
sis were also carried out; all (except one) were recruited separately from the CMHTs: 11
through a bipolar psychoeducation course and 15 through third sector mental health
organisations.
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Since psychiatric diagnosis is a complex process which occurs across diverse spaces, a vari-
ety of broadly diagnostic assessments were observed: initial screening assessments within
CMHTs; psychiatric assessments within CMHTs (both initial and follow-up) and the PSOC.
While initial psychiatry appointments were the most explicitly dedicated to the diagnosis of
patients, follow-up assessments were observed since a deﬁnitive diagnosis often takes consid-
erably longer than one session. Initial screening assessments were carried out by two CMHT
professionals (usually comprising of community psychiatric nurses, social workers and occupa-
tional therapists). I chose to observe initial CMHT screening assessments as professionals had
informed me that patients often seek diagnoses within these encounters and diagnosis was
therefore frequently discussed (although not formally assigned). These assessments also consti-
tute crucial encounters for patients, since the outcome signiﬁcantly shapes decisions regarding
the allocation of more specialised services. Initial appointments (both screening and psychi-
atric) within the CMHTs lasted around an hour and involved a fairly thorough exploration of a
patient’s personal history and psychosocial circumstances. Follow-up appointments lasted
30 minutes. Second opinion consultations often lasted several hours since they were generally
one-off encounters.
The main corpus of observations consisted of 21 CMHT screening assessments, 6 initial-
psychiatric CMHT appointments, 24 follow-up CMHT appointments and 5 second opinion
assessments (n = 56). Two multidisciplinary team screening meetings were also observed. The
research was approved by an NHS research ethics committee and by the local trust R & D
committee. Information was sent out to patients along with appointment letters to inform them
of the study and to allow sufﬁcient time to opt-out. Before appointments, professionals would
double-check with participants to make sure they had received the study documentation and
were happy to participate. I then introduced myself, explained the study and answered any
questions. During appointments I made ﬁeld notes, trying to capture as much dialogue as pos-
sible (capturing verbatim quotes where possible) as well as details regarding body language,
spatial positioning, tone of voice, etc. Since note-taking is common practice within such
assessments,4 my own note-taking was arguably partly camouﬂaged. Furthermore, the profes-
sionals themselves were used to being observed regularly by placement medical students.
I also observed conversations between staff prior to and following assessments, while pro-
fessionals wrote up their notes and awaited the next appointment. This backstage behaviour –
occurring when patients were not present – was useful since I could observe how professionals
categorised patients in ways that were not always communicated to patients themselves. It was
thus possible to test my interpretations of professionals’ behaviour during the assessment, by
triangulating with their more explicit talk following appointments. It was also illuminating
since I witnessed the common practices of informal diagnosing (as noted by Dobransky 2009)
and diagnostic denial (i.e. denying a person’s claim to a diagnosis), often from professionals
without formal rights to assign diagnosis.
A thematic analysis of ﬁeld notes was conducted using NVivo 10 QAQDAS (Computer
Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software; QSR International, Brisbane, Australia) to facilitate
the generation of codes and descriptions. A grounded theorising (Hammersley and Atkinson
2007: 158) approach was taken to the analysis of data, involving a constant interplay between
data and theory throughout the research process: ideas were developed to try and explain the
data, and the data were then returned to in order to test the ﬁt of these ideas and theories. The
analysis was also informed by a social constructionist approach, which focused on the perfor-
mance of identity within participant ‘accounts’ (Scott and Lyman 1968) and did not take for
granted the underlying nature of psychiatric categories and classiﬁcations.
Given the word constraints I opted to present observational data from a single detailed case
which represents a number of themes that arose across the dataset. This case illustrates in
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detail the means by which professionals and patients may go about negotiating and contesting
diagnosis, and the way in which uncertainty of various kinds are articulated and addressed.
Since negotiating a diagnosis is in itself a complex activity which involves a full consideration
of a person and their narrative, I felt that the interactional detail and subtle nuances within the
process of diagnostic negotiation were important to preserve.
Negotiating diagnosis and diagnostic upgrading/downgrading
A common pattern in assessments was the tendency for patients to seek out psychiatric diagnoses.
This would often elicit sceptical responses from professionals,5 who tended to align patients with
less exclusive diagnostic categories, such as anxiety and depression (the so-called ‘common men-
tal disorders’), or informally label them with morally charged diagnoses such as borderline per-
sonality disorder (BPD).6 This reframing echoes previous research demonstrating the role of
implicit and explicit categorisation in determining CMHT gatekeeping decisions (Grifﬁths 2001);
patient selection and rationing were linked to two prominent categories in CMHT documentation
at the time: the `seriously mentally ill’ and ‘the worried well’; staff denied individuals access to
services by reframing patients’ difﬁculties as ‘life problems’ as opposed to serious mental illness.
Current CMHT guidance similarly suggests focusing resources on those with ‘severe and/or
enduring mental disorder’ (Cardiff and Vale University Health Board 2012).
As previous sociological research has shown, healthcare triaging processes and the associ-
ated classiﬁcation of patients are often highly moral exercises (Dingwall and Murray 1983,
Hillman 2014, Jeffery 1979). Since the denial of diagnosis can equate to reduced access to ser-
vices, status and resources, leaving individuals open to accusations of malingering (Clarke and
James 2003, Lillrank 2003, Nettleton 2006, Ware 1992), patients are compelled to convinc-
ingly enact the ‘sick role’ in order to legitimise their struggles (Glenton 2003, Parsons 1951,
Werner and Malterud 2003). Consistent with this, patients within the current study tended to
downplay their blameworthiness in various ways, by emphasising the unpredictability and
uncontrollability of symptoms, and working to upgrade to a more medicalised diagnosis,7 as
will be illustrated.
Several professionals in this study spoke of the perception that a diagnosis could appear to
absolve patients of responsibility for their problems. However, some diagnoses appear to con-
fer greater protection from such accusations than others, with those perceived to be psycholog-
ical and functional (as opposed to organic) seen as weakening the legitimacy of suffering
(Glenton 2003, Nettleton 2006). Similarly, in the current study, patients appeared to use vari-
ous strategies to align themselves with more exclusive and medicalised diagnostic categories
(most commonly those of bipolar disorder, autism and ADHD), emphasising the characteristics
associated with these categories, citing evidence from others to verify diagnostically salient
traits and recounting psychiatric family histories. The increasing numbers actively seeking a
diagnosis of bipolar disorder in particular (Chan and Sireling 2010) has been noted by psychi-
atrists, with one psychiatrist in the current study commenting (following an appointment) that
this was ‘the ﬁrst person to not want to hear they have bipolar’. By contrast BPD – a diagno-
sis which is less medicalised (Kendall et al. 2009, Sulzer 2015) and has repeatedly been
shown to elicit strong negative reactions from mental health professionals (e.g. Dobransky
2009, Lam et al. 2016, Markham 2003, Sulzer 2015) – tended to be resisted by patients. As
found by Dobransky (2009), staff in the present study appeared to distinguish between those
whose behaviour was attributed to illness (e.g. those with psychotic and severe mood disor-
ders) and those considered to have lifestyle/personality/behavioural problems, who elicited
more self-managing guidance and moralising responses from professionals.
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Presenting an authentic diagnostic narrative
The following example concerns ‘Hannah’, a woman in her 30s who attends an initial psy-
chiatry appointment seeking a diagnosis of autism (her partner who accompanies her, men-
tions before the appointment how long it has taken them to get an assessment for this).
However, even before the appointment begins, doubt is cast over the authenticity of Han-
nah’s problems; Dr. A reads aloud from her referral letter that she has had a history of anxi-
ety, depression, attempted suicide and ‘historic abuse’ by her stepfather’s brother; her
brother has a diagnosis of autism, and Hannah believes she herself has autism. I ask Dr. A
whether it is common for patients to come in with an idea of what diagnosis they might
have – she says yes, very common because nowadays it is so easy to get information from
the Internet and that apparently, you can download diagnostic interviews from I-tunes (she
seems horriﬁed by this). She also comments that people would rather believe they have
something to explain their behaviour rather than take responsibility for it themselves. Dr. A.
reads out from previous case notes that the patient presented as suicidal and as not making
eye contact despite being spotted outside the clinic laughing and eating lunch with her girl-
friend. Hannah had claimed to self-harm by carving names on her skin, although ‘there was
no evidence of this’. The notes already cast doubt over the legitimacy of her accounts, and
much of the assessment is characterised by professional scepticism. Here is an extract from
my ﬁeld notes during this encounter:
Dr. A begins by exploring Hannah’s depression and anxiety, asking what makes her anx-
ious. She replies that noises disturb and overwhelm her, as well as socialising and going
out, e.g. making small talk and interacting with people as opposed to crowds per se. She
also ﬁnds talking on the phone difﬁcult. Dr. A asks if she had phoned up to cancel todays
appointment would Hannah have answered? she replies no she would let it go to voicemail.
Dr. A says it is important to answer these types of calls – she would never leave a message
for a patient as you don’t know who might hear it – so it is important to answer phone calls
as you don’t know what opportunities you might miss.
Dr. A appears to be testing the severity of Hannah’s anxiety when asking whether she would
answer the phone: however, when Hannah conﬁrms the seriousness of her problems by indi-
cating that she would not answer, her behaviour is framed as a harmful choice, rather than as
a sign of disorder. The attributes emphasised by Hannah match closely to common symptoms
of autism, such as difﬁculties with social interaction, and unusual sensitivity to sensory stimuli
(American Psychiatric Association 2013), also noted by Hacking (2009a) to be a common fea-
ture of autism autobiographies. Similarly, when asked what she enjoys doing Hannah says
only that she loves playing with Lego, which she collects. She tells how when she was a child
she needed to collect toys as opposed to wanting them to play with, suggesting another feature
consistent with autism: ‘restricted, ﬁxated patterns of interests that are abnormal in intensity or
focus’ (American Psychiatric Association 2013).
When asked about family background, she provides further evidence to indicate her compat-
ibility with autism by emphasising her resemblance to her brother, who has been diagnosed
with autism, stating that they get along really well as they both ‘think in the same way and
are really similar’. Hannah draws upon understandings of the genetic inheritance of mental dis-
orders as further evidence:
She says her father deﬁnitely had ‘something wrong with him’, although undiagnosed as he
did not talk about his emotions. Dr. A asks about her mother and she says her mother also
believes herself to have autism as well as problems with depression (and severe postnatal
depression). It was her mum who suggested that Hannah might have autism. She also
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mentions a cousin on her father’s side who has a diagnosis of autism, further establishing a
family link on both sides of the family.
Professionals consistently asked about family histories of psychiatric problems in the assess-
ments, and patients demonstrated awareness of the diagnostic signiﬁcance of genetics, by read-
ily divulging details of family members’ psychiatric problems or general eccentricities. In the
above example, Hannah suggests that her dad had something undiagnosed, which further
strengthens her implied genetic predisposition to mental health problems.
Atypical diagnostic presentations and reframing diagnostic boundaries
Despite Hannah’s establishing of a family link to autism, her attempts are undermined by her
atypical presentation and high-functioning status, as will be shown in the following extracts.
She possesses characteristics which undermine her compatibility with autism (e.g. managing to
hold down a job and interact successfully with others; her autism wasn’t picked up as a child
etc.). As such she must work to reframe classic notions of autism in order to incorporate her
particular symptoms, by emphasising the hidden nature of her symptoms, and her use of adap-
tive strategies which allowed her to hide her symptoms.
Dr. A tells Hannah that one of the criteria for an autism diagnosis is that the associated
symptoms must have been present before the age of three; she would therefore need Hannah’s
mother to be present in order to do a formal diagnostic assessment for autism. She continues
her pre-assessment by asking Hannah if she has always been the way she is now
Hannah replies yes immediately, stating that she has always felt different: ‘like an alien’.
She describes struggling to ﬁt in, thinking differently to others and difﬁculties seeing from
others’ viewpoints. In pre-school teachers would tell her to make friends but she was
unable to relate to other children and would just be doing her own thing, that she always
got on better with adults as a child. She suggests that her teachers probably just thought
she was shy, but it was that she was different. She adds that she learnt to cope with this
and ﬁt in by putting on characters, playing a game called ‘let’s try to be normal’ where
she would pretend to be a normal person. She says school reports would always mention
how she needed to make more friends. Dr. A asks if she still has these reports (presum-
ably to bring to the ofﬁcial diagnostic interview). Hannah explains that a lot of stuff at
her nans would have been thrown out after her death, but that she would see what she
could ﬁnd.
In using the alien metaphor to describe her feelings of difference, Hannah is drawing upon a
common trope found in some autism communities (Hacking 2009b). By stressing her active
use of coping skills in hiding her difference, she justiﬁes the lack of obvious autism traits;
those traits which were visible (i.e. lack of social interaction) are depicted as having been mis-
interpreted as signifying more common difﬁculties (i.e. shyness). She emphasises her proactive
use of coping skills again when asked about secondary school, explaining that she had friends
because she realised this would be necessary to avoid being bullied: her apparent normality is
explained by her self-preservation instinct. Further on in the appointment, Dr. A expresses fur-
ther surprise at Hannah’s career success given her interpersonal difﬁculties:
Dr. A asks why Hannah is unable to make eye contact with her today (joking about the cen-
ter not being very nice to look at and about herself being ‘scary’) even though she has done
all these jobs where making eye contact and body language etc. are all very important. Han-
nah nods as if she understands what Dr. A is getting at. She explains that this is due to the
‘characters’ that she puts on: in work she adopts these characters as she knows this is appro-
priate, whereas in this situation she thinks it is better for the doctor to see her as she really
© 2019 The Author. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
Expanding boundaries in psychiatry 7
is; that she is not putting on any act and is acting naturally. She adds that her colleagues
might look at her now and say: ‘that’s not the real Hannah – the way she acts in work is
the real Hannah’ – but that’s not true.
Hannah ﬁghts to establish the authenticity of her autism symptoms by presenting her ‘normal’
behaviour as reﬂecting an inauthentic version of herself; her ‘autistic’ self is presented as the
authentic version. The term ‘characters’ emphasises the artiﬁciality of her attempts to adopt
normal mannerisms. This presentation of an inauthentic self establishes external behaviour as
an unreliable diagnostic measure, since it does not accurately reﬂect the inner authentic self on
which diagnosis should be based. This notion is premised on an ‘essentialist’ model of diagno-
sis, whereby disorders are deﬁned by their ‘true’ underlying nature and reiﬁed as natural kinds
(Zachar and Kendler 2007). The ontological status of autism as an entity goes unquestioned:
an individual may ‘have’ this disorder but learn how to hide it.
Justifying diagnostic stake
This contrast between an authentic and inauthentic self is further described when Dr. A asks
Hannah whether she is still on sick leave from her current job:
Hannah afﬁrms that she ﬁnds her current job really stressful as she is in a noisy ofﬁce envi-
ronment where you have to make pointless small talk with people which she ﬁnds really dif-
ﬁcult. She has gotten to the point where it is just too much putting on the act and that her
‘real self is just spilling out’. It emerges later that she has in fact handed her notice in and
she explains how she couldn’t carry on making herself miserable anymore by working in
this environment. She had requested to work from home some of the time to make things
easier, but this was refused and she handed her notice in.
Hannah’s unemployed status and lack of leniency from her employers may undermine the
authenticity of her account, since it reveals a morally problematic stake in obtaining an autism
diagnosis. Dr. A. addresses this by asking Hannah explicitly what she hopes to gain by obtain-
ing a diagnosis, compelling her to provide a more morally acceptable motivation, which draw
upon notions of identity ﬁt, self-awareness and self-management:
Dr. A. states that she is uncertain about Hannah’s diagnostic status, and further that there is
a limit to how much they can help (with autism). She asks what Hannah is hoping to get
from the diagnosis and why is it important to her, since having the diagnosis might not
make things much better, as there is not much help available for this (i.e. autism). Hannah
says that she would ﬁnd it helpful just in understanding herself, because if she knows
what’s wrong with her she can research it and know what strategies to put in place to help
herself. She explains how she knows she has depression and anxiety etc. but that with aut-
ism it just ﬁts; she has felt for a long time that she has it and when her brother was diag-
nosed she read about it and thought ‘that’s me: that describes me exactly’. She also says
she feels like she is ‘wearing clothes that don’t ﬁt’ and that ‘the jigsaw pieces don’t ﬁt
together’. She wants ‘clothes that ﬁt’ (i.e. appropriate diagnosis). Dr. A nods understand-
ingly here.
The issue at stake in the above extract is not only the patient’s authenticity and problematic ﬁt
with the diagnostic category but also the utility of receiving a diagnosis, suggesting a model
of disorder which emphasises usefulness rather than any underlying reality. However, further
on, when Dr. A. explains that she will see Hannah for a formal diagnostic interview, autism is
described less as a practical category, and more as an objective entity: an essentialist as
opposed to a nominalist approach to psychiatric diagnosis (Zachar and Kendler 2007). With
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such an essentialist approach it is not sufﬁcient to demonstrate the presence of traits which
might require professional attention and increase vulnerability to other mental health problems
(e.g. difﬁculties adapting to change, social interaction and abnormal repetitive behaviour); in
order to receive a diagnosis and its associated beneﬁts, there is a need to achieve full category
status by proving the underlying reality of disorder (e.g. by drawing on ‘objective’ evidence
from parents and teachers about the presence of traits prior to the age of three).
Reframing as functional disorder
At the end of the session Dr. A explains that she will see Hannah for a proper diagnostic
session with her mother (a ‘DISCO’ – diagnostic interview for social and communication
disorders), although she expresses doubt as to whether Hannah ‘has’ autism or not. She
describes Hannah as ‘a bit of a mixed bag’ – she has some of the traits but some she
doesn’t have and that she has also had to deal with many traumatic and difﬁcult situations
and has had to come up with strategies for dealing with these, and it seems to be implied
that this reaction to traumas may better explain her current difﬁculties. Dr. A. mentions that
Hannah doesn’t ﬁt typical autism in some ways, e.g. she is not good at maths but is good at
English, explaining how typically people with autism do not understand metaphor or poetry
– they may like the rules of grammar, but they tend to like maths because it is a matter of
following the rules.
Here it seems that the incidence of childhood trauma is taken as evidence against the pres-
ence of autism, consistent with the dominant view of autism as organic (as opposed to func-
tional) in nature. It also represents an ‘entity’ perspective, emphasising uniformity as opposed
to unique individual expressions of disorder (Zachar and Kendler 2007).8 Past trauma was
also used to provide evidence against developmental and psychotic disorders in other
appointments. While aetiological information may be useful for professionals in forming an
overall picture of a patient, using such information as evidence against a particular diagnosis
may disadvantage (i.e. make diagnosis a more difﬁcult process for) those with documented
trauma.
As argued by Navon and Eyal (2016) and consistent with Ian Hacking’s ‘looping effect’
(1995), it is possible that patients’ attempts to match their own symptomatology to a particular
diagnosis might result in the broadening of the categories in question. For instance, Hannah
presenting the argument that she has learnt to disguise her symptoms encourages the consider-
ation of invisible and internal symptoms in diagnostic decision-making, potentially leading to
the widening of the diagnostic category to include those with unusual or less extreme symp-
toms. Such tendencies may be shaped by popular discourses concerning the underdiagnosis of
certain populations, for example, the alleged underdiagnosis of autism in women has been
commonly presented in both popular and academic mediums in recent years (e.g. Cheslack-
Postava and Jordan-Young 2011).9 Because of individuals like Hannah ﬁghting for a diagno-
sis, more of those who are ‘a mixed bag’ and less ‘typical’ diagnostically, may end up widen-
ing and changing the diagnostic category in question.10
After Hannah (relatively successfully) justiﬁes both her lack of obvious autism symptoms
and her desire for a diagnosis, Dr. A ends by downplaying the importance of obtaining a
diagnosis by stressing the primacy of Hannah’s anxiety issues in her future self-manage-
ment:
Dr. A states that even if Hannah receives an autism diagnosis – she still thinks that the
major thing for her will be in learning how to ‘manage her anxiety’, and to not be hard on
herself: we cannot all be the same – it is just about doing what you have already been doing
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– trying to act in the appropriate ways even if you feel different and accepting that you are
different etc. She recommends a local cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) course on
managing anxiety called ‘living life to the full’, which Hannah has already been on and
found somewhat helpful. She also recommends an anxiety management app from Bristol
University and talks about the helpfulness of breathing exercises.
The conclusion of this encounter is that Hannah achieves a provisional diagnostic status: her
strategies have obliged Dr. A to investigate her diagnosis further. However, perhaps due to her
uncertain diagnostic status, her difﬁculties are subject to reframing and downgrading as func-
tional and anxiety-related, which – as per the advice on breathing techniques and CBT – is
something that she must learn to self-manage. Hannah is still subject to downgrading since the
anxiety is given primacy above the autism associated traits. This downgrading to emphasise
anxiety/stress was a common feature of CMHT assessments, allowing professionals to high-
light patients’ own agency in managing their mental health, and to steer them towards less
intensive services and self-management such as primary mental health courses, self-help
‘apps’, mindfulness and ‘bibliotherapy’.
The ontological uncertainty surrounding psychiatric diagnoses is not voiced within the
appointment even though the lack of clear boundaries between diagnostic categories would
arguably be potentially helpful information in Hannah’s case. This reiﬁcation and adherence to
categorical understandings of disorder was common across assessments and – when combined
with individual diagnostic uncertainty – appeared to facilitate downgraded of patients’ difﬁcul-
ties to a less medicalised category (i.e. ‘mild or common mental disorder’ rather than ‘severe
or enduring mental disorder’), which allows the responsibilisation of patients for their own dif-
ﬁculties. Consultations featuring diagnostic uncertainty – such as Hannah’s, contrasted sharply
with assessments where individuals were given a clear diagnosis (particularly those diagnosed
with a more severe/exclusive category), who were usually responded to in a sympathetic man-
ner. This downgrading could also have practical implications for their access to services both
within and outside of the clinic, as suggested by Hannah’s (unsuccessful) attempt to obtain
ﬂexible working arrangements at work.
A moral hierarchy of diagnosis
While the moral downgrading evidenced by Hannah’s case may be fairly subtle, a more expli-
cit relationship between demedicalisation and moral downgrading was evident in cases involv-
ing suspected personality disorder, where professionals would frequently refer to
the responsibility of patients for their own difﬁculties, echoing previous ﬁndings regarding
BPD in particular (e.g. Bonnington and Rose 2014, Dobransky 2009, Sulzer 2015).
However, the current study suggests a moral hierarchy of diagnosis within psychiatry, whereby
diagnoses associated with psychosis (such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia) hold greater
currency than personality disorder or common mental problems (such as anxiety-related disor-
ders and depression). This echoes previous ﬁndings on the prestige rankings of disability,
where less medicalised diagnoses were ranked lower, and where common mental disorders
such as depression and anxiety ranked particularly low (Grue et al. 2015).
In the following interview extract, Cerys, a participant with a diagnosis of recurrent depres-
sion, describes her reaction to the suggestion that she falls short of meeting the criteria for
bipolar disorder, having sought a second opinion from a private psychiatrist:
Cerys: Well the other diagnosis that was in the mix since last November was . . . well, it
was at the same time as the dissociation, saying that they were ruling out bipolar because
although I had characteristics of mood instability, I don’t become elated enough to meet the
markers. So, with the dissociation was a suggestion that I have . . . untrue bipolar, and I was
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thinking ‘god I can’t even have proper bipolar’, you know the experience of the highs and
the lows because I don’t meet the high.
(. . ..)
I: So how did you feel when you heard that?
Cerys: Well it’s a bit like failure isn’t it – it’s a bit like you can’t even have the right diag-
nosis.
Cerys’s comment that not achieving bipolar status feels like a failure suggests not only a moral
hierarchy of psychiatric diagnoses, but also the implications of a sub-threshold diagnostic sta-
tus which is arguably exacerbated by the dominance of categorical understandings of diagno-
sis. Once again, the diagnostic uncertainty becomes an individual matter, as Cerys ‘fails’ to
meet the threshold for bipolar disorder and is placed into the arguably lesser category of ‘un-
true bipolar’; the locus of uncertainty does not surround the diagnosis itself and its boundaries.
Arguably, if dimensional notions of diagnosis were more dominant, this marginal status would
be more normalised for patients.
Discussion
By focusing on interactions where diagnosis is negotiated, this article contributes to the sociol-
ogy of diagnosis by illustrating the opposing forces acting upon the boundaries of diagnostic
categories within clinical interactions. It also explores the role played by different types of
uncertainty in shaping diagnostic interactions which have signiﬁcant psychosocial conse-
quences for patients; in particular it focuses upon the implications of individual diagnostic
uncertainty when combined with a de-emphasis upon ontological uncertainty regarding the
underlying nature of psychiatric diagnosis. It is argued that the diagnostic reiﬁcation and
silence regarding ontological uncertainty plays a key role in the moral categorisation of
patients, facilitating the downgrading of patients, and allowing them to be more easily redi-
rected towards less intensive services. Paradoxically, epistemological uncertainty arguably
facilitates both the contesting of sought-after diagnoses (such as bipolar disorder and autism)
and the enabling of informal diagnostic practices by professionals.
As shown by previous sociological research, diagnosis demonstrates itself to be a moral
business, with a moral hierarchy of diagnosis within CMHT settings which many patients dis-
played an awareness of. This is illustrated by patients’ frequent attempts to negotiate more val-
idating diagnoses, using strategies to align themselves with more exclusive categories and
drawing upon popular discourses regarding the underdiagnosis of certain populations. It is
unlikely that these are conscious or dishonest strategies; rather, they illustrate how ‘looping
effects of human kinds’ (Hacking 1995) occur in practice, with patients coming to identify
with particular labels, contributing to the broadening of diagnostic boundaries and changing
the meanings associated with diagnostic categories (e.g. through the inclusion of atypical or
less extreme symptoms). Contrastingly, professionals tended to downgrade patients’ problems,
withholding more exclusive and medicalised diagnoses, and consequently support.
In focusing on community-based services – where people mostly choose to attend appoint-
ments – this study likely portrays a partial view of diagnostic cultures and practices in psychi-
atry. There are clearly also many who actively resist medicalisation; however, such individuals
are less likely to attend appointments and were therefore infrequent in this study. It is also not
the intention here to suggest that all patients seeking out a medicalised diagnosis should
receive one: there are clear downsides to receiving a psychiatric diagnosis, and many would
argue the merits of withholding a formal diagnosis from patients, such as in encouraging a
stronger sense of agency. However, while critics of psychiatry have tended to focus upon the
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stigmatising consequences of diagnostic labelling, this study suggests that attention must also
be given to the consequences of withholding diagnosis, particularly for individuals who have a
liminal or uncertain status. The demedicalisation involved can manifest as ‘volitional stigma’
(Easter 2012), whereby behaviour is interpreted as an ongoing voluntary choice rather than
stemming from mental illness. Patients may seek out more medicalised categories in order to
offset such moralising reactions. Thus, although professionals may ﬁnd diagnosis-seeking
behaviour difﬁcult (Chan and Sireling 2010), practices of diagnostic downgrading may inad-
vertently prompt this tendency in patients, who will be further driven to upgrade their medical
status. This tendency is perhaps likely to be particularly evident within CMHTs, where
resources are particularly constrained within the context of economic austerity.
The perpetuation of categorical certainty combined with an emphasis upon individual diag-
nostic uncertainty allows patients to be clearly excluded from membership of more exclusive
and sought-after categories (such as bipolar disorder and autism), contributing to this cycle of
diagnosis seeking and downgrading. This allows more intensive services (e.g. secondary men-
tal health services) to be withheld, and for moral responsibility to be re-directed onto patients
themselves. It also places the source of the uncertainty within the individual themselves, rather
than within medicine or the mental health system. The categorical understanding of diagnosis
– whereby individuals are considered to either ‘have’ or not have a diagnosis – arguably disad-
vantages those such as Hannah and Cerys, who exhibit atypical symptoms of a particular cate-
gory, or for those whose complex presentations cannot be reduced to one category. There will
be implications for their ability to access important services and resources, and for their sense
of self.
Less reiﬁcation of psychiatric categories (e.g. by discussing concepts such as diagnostic con-
tinua, overlap and heterogeneity) might arguably ease the suffering of patients whose diagnosis
is uncertain. Scholars have highlighted both the potential beneﬁts of emphasising uncertainty
within clinical communication (Buetow 2011, Gordon et al. 2000) as well as the harms associ-
ated with categorical reiﬁcation and denial regarding ontological uncertainty (Pickersgill 2009).
Although evidence suggests that professionals are often aware of the imperfect knowledge
regarding diagnostic categories (e.g. Rafalovich 2005), this study suggests that ontological
uncertainty is not routinely communicated with patients, with discussions tending to centre
upon whether patients ‘had’ or did not ‘have’ a particular diagnosis. This tendency for clini-
cians to de-emphasise uncertainty has been noted by several sociologists (e.g. Atkinson 1984,
Buetow 2011, Fox 2000, Katz 1984). However, ﬁndings here suggest that it is ontological
uncertainty in particular which often remains unarticulated, while uncertainty regarding indi-
vidual diagnosis was expressed. Given that diagnostic uncertainty is a common feature within
psychiatry, a move towards dimensional models which emphasise severity, incorporate hetero-
geneity and emphasise individual symptoms as opposed to categorical status, may be more
appropriate within clinical communication, particularly for those on the boundaries of a
diagnosis.
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Notes
1 As pointed out by Hollin (2017), autism ﬁction has evolved into a recognised genre.
2 While there are some exceptions to this, biomarkers are not generally used for diagnostic purposes in
psychiatry.
3 Schizophrenia, ADHD (e.g. Rafalovich 2005) and personality disorder have faced particular criticism
regarding their validity.
4 Psychiatrists would take notes during their consultations, and during screening assessments, one pro-
fessional would generally take thorough notes, while the other would ask questions.
5 At times, following appointments – professionals explicitly accused patients of seeking a diagnosis
for the purpose of claiming beneﬁts.
6 Diagnoses of PD were often assigned informally during professional discussions and not communi-
cated to patients. This was in the vast majority of occasions referring to BPD and (in all but one
case) applied to female patients.
7 For instance, on several occasions patients with a diagnosis of BPD actively sought out more medi-
calised diagnoses such as bipolar disorder. Three patients were observed explicitly looking to change
their BPD diagnosis to bipolar disorder; several interview participants also explicitly described hav-
ing gone through this process. Several patients (such as Hannah) also sought diagnoses of develop-
mental disorders as opposed to anxiety/depression.
8 ‘Entity’ perspectives have been dominant in psychiatry since DSM–3, while unique individual
expressions of disorder were advocated by DSM–1 (Zachar and Kendler 2007).
9 This argument has also been made regarding ADHD.
10 This broadening of a diagnostic category has also occurred with bipolar spectrum disorders (e.g.
Angst and Gamma 2002).
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